Regulating Interrogations and Excluding Confessions in the United States: Balancing Individual Rights and the Search for Truth by Turner, Jenia I.
Regulating Interrogations
and Excluding Confessions in the United
States: Balancing Individual Rights
and the Search for the Truth
Jenia Iontcheva Turner
Abstract This chapter discusses U.S. constitutional law surrounding the admis-
sibility of confessions and the contexts in which the law demands exclusion and
those in which a cost-beneﬁt analysis by the court results in its inclusion.
Justiﬁcations and practical effects of exclusionary rules and the public debates
surrounding their use are explained. In the U.S., rights that are expressly protected
by the Constitution—such as the right to remain silent, the right to be free from an
unreasonable search or seizure, and the right to counsel—are weighed more heavily
than the state’s need to fully explore the facts in a criminal case. The values of
fairness, dignity, privacy, and liberty embodied in these rights frequently outweigh
the need for reliable fact ﬁnding. In deciding how to enforce these constitutional
rights, however, U.S. courts are well aware of competing interests throughout the
criminal justice system.
1 Introduction
Like other criminal justice systems, the U.S. system must balance, on the one hand,
enforcing the criminal law and, on the other, protecting individual rights in the
process. Reliable fact-ﬁnding is a prerequisite to the effective enforcement of
criminal law and to just outcomes. Protection of individual rights often promotes
reliable fact-ﬁnding, as when a ban on involuntary confessions prevents the
introduction of unreliable testimony at trial. On occasion, however, the commitment
to accurate fact-ﬁnding may conflict with individual rights in a particular case. One
of the clearest examples of such a conflict occurs when a court must decide whether
to admit reliable and probative evidence obtained in violation of constitutional
rights.
In the United States, rights that are expressly protected by the Constitution—
such as the right to remain silent, the right to be free from unreasonable search or
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seizure, and the right to counsel—are given more weight in the balance than the
state’s need to explore fully the facts in a criminal case. The values of fairness,
dignity, privacy, and liberty embodied in these rights frequently outweigh the
concern for reliable factﬁnding. But in deciding how to enforce these constitutional
rights, U.S. courts have recognized the relevance of competing interests in the
criminal justice system, such as the interest in truthseeking. In deciding whether to
exclude evidence, for example, courts have considered whether exclusion is
expressly required by the Constitution and whether the beneﬁts of exclusion, such
as deterring police misconduct, outweigh its costs to truthseeking.
This report examines U.S. constitutional law on admissibility of confessions and
discusses the contexts in which the law demands exclusion and contexts in which a
cost-beneﬁt analysis has led courts to reject exclusion. The report further explains
the justiﬁcations and practical effects of exclusionary rules and the public debates
surrounding their use.
2 Fact-Finding Procedure: Stages, Rules, and Actors
Before examining the law that regulates the search for truth and the protection of
individual rights in criminal cases, it is useful to review the stages and rules of the
factﬁnding process and the actors involved in it. A brief overview of the structure
and institutions of criminal justice helps illustrate more clearly how legal rules
apply in practice.
2.1 Stages and Rules
In the U.S. criminal justice system, the investigative and trial stages of the criminal
process are not as strictly delineated as they are in some inquisitorial systems. The
investigation frequently continues after formal charges are ﬁled and, in some cases,
even after the trial has begun. Yet the actors who investigate—the police or other
government agents—do so independently and without supervision from prosecu-
tors.1 As a practical matter, police ofﬁcers may end a case by choosing not to
investigate further or not to arrest a suspect.2 In serious cases, however, police
ofﬁcers typically are held accountable by political pressure to maintain a high
clearance rate.
1At the state level, police are generally not supervised by prosecutors during their investigations.
While in some specialized units and in some larger urban counties, police may run applications for
a warrant by a prosecutor, this is the exception rather than the rule. By contrast, at the federal level,
prosecutors routinely review warrant applications and other key investigative decisions with
agents.
2See Saltzburg/Capra, 2014 at 958–59.
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When police ofﬁcers do identify a suspect and bring forward evidence to support
a complaint, prosecutors decide whether and what charges to ﬁle with the court. In
some jurisdictions, in felony cases, prosecutors must obtain an indictment through a
grand jury composed of ordinary citizens.3 The grand jury has an investigative as
well as a screening function. It can subpoena witnesses and documents to aid the
investigation, and it must decide whether the evidence provides probable cause to
conﬁrm an indictment. A little over half of U.S. states rely on a different mechanism
—a preliminary hearing to evaluate whether probable cause supports the charges
brought by the prosecutor. Unlike the grand jury, the preliminary hearing is
adversarial in nature and allows both the prosecution and the defense to present
evidence to a neutral magistrate. Defendants may and frequently do waive pre-
liminary hearings, and the case then proceeds directly to the trial court. Regardless
of whether the case proceeds via a preliminary hearing or via a grand jury indict-
ment, the prosecutor retains broad discretion over charging decisions.4
The next step in the process is frequently a plea hearing before the trial court, as
the overwhelming majority of U.S. state and federal cases are resolved through
guilty pleas rather than trials. Guilty pleas typically result from negotiations
between the defense and the prosecution. The negotiations may occur at any point
before or during trial, although the vast majority of cases are resolved before trial.
A major advantage of the guilty plea, from the perspective of the prosecution, is that
it abbreviates the investigation and dispenses with a trial, saving precious resources.
In some cases, plea bargaining also induces defendants to reveal valuable infor-
mation about other cases, thus contributing to the search for truth.
Yet the abbreviated process also increases the risk of inaccurate or unfair
judgments. Recognizing this risk, state and federal rules require that, before
accepting a guilty plea, the court must examine the record and the defendant to
determine that the guilty plea is voluntary, knowing, and factually based.5 In
practice, however, the plea hearing is typically perfunctory and courts rarely
challenge the version of the facts negotiated by the parties and presented summarily
at the hearing.
If the case is not resolved by a guilty plea, the defendant has the right to a jury
trial.6 Evidence rules that apply at trial generally attempt to increase the accuracy
3Saltzburg/Capra, 2014 at 987 (noting that “slightly less than half” the states require the use of a
grand jury for felonies).
4A judge or a grand jury may reject charges ﬁled by a prosecutor, but the prosecutor retains the
ultimate discretion to decline charges, even where a grand jury chooses to indict. Furthermore, as
long as the evidence supports a charge, neither the grand jury nor the judge can question the
prosecutor’s choice about which of several possible charges the prosecutor chooses to ﬁle.
Overlapping statutes frequently give prosecutors several choices of charges to pick from, often
with different sentencing consequences.
5See, e.g., Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rule 11 of 1 December 2016 as amended).
6Some defendants waive this right and opt for a bench trial. Note that, in some jurisdictions, the
prosecution has to consent to the waiver of a jury trial. See Singer v. United States, 380 US 24, 36
(1965).
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and fairness of the process by preventing the jury from seeing certain overly
prejudicial or potentially unreliable evidence.7 The trial is public, and a verbatim
transcript is produced. The transcript can be used as needed for purposes of chal-
lenging and reviewing the verdict on appeal. Some jurisdictions also allow for the
broadcasting of criminal proceedings, as discussed below in Sect. 3.4.2.
Unlike in inquisitorial systems, sentencing is a separate stage of the criminal
process in the United States. It follows different, typically more relaxed rules of
evidence and procedure from those at trial. For example, the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule has been held not to apply at sentencing.8 The Privilege against
Self-Incrimination, however, continues to apply at sentencing as it does at trial, and
so does the rule requiring exclusion of coerced confessions.9
2.2 Actors and Accountability
At the state level, American police ofﬁcers conduct investigations. Prosecutors are
typically not involved in the investigations and do not have supervisory power over
police ofﬁcers, although they rely on the evidence collected by ofﬁcers to support
the charges they choose to ﬁle.10 At the federal level, prosecutors are more likely to
take part in the investigation, particularly in more complex cases, such as those
concerning white-collar crimes.11 Even at the federal level, however, prosecutors
have no authority to discipline investigative agents, so their “supervision” is gen-
erally informal and limited to correcting errors as the investigation unfolds.12
Because prosecutors depend on police ofﬁcers to obtain convictions in their
cases, however, they often refrain from looking too closely for gaps and flaws in
police investigations.13 More importantly, prosecutors typically lack the time and
resources to adequately review police investigations in a thorough fashion.14
Finally, chief prosecutors at the state level are typically chosen in popular elections,
and support by police unions is important for electoral success. Political calcula-
tions therefore further discourage critical oversight of police actions by prosecutors.
7See, e.g., Federal Rules of Evidence (Rules 403, 801, 802 of 1 December 2015 as amended).
8See United States v. Tejada, 956 F2d 1256, 1262–63 (2nd Cir. 1992).
9See Mitchell v. United States, 526 US 314, 325–27 (1999).
10Luna/Wade, 2010 at 1467–68; see also Geller, 1975 at 721 (“Historically, the American police
department has been independent of the prosecutor’s ofﬁce: that is, neither police nor prosecutor
directly gives or takes orders from the other. As a result, the prosecutor … is unable to command
police ofﬁcers to conduct their searches within constitutional bounds.”).
11See generally Richman, 1999 at 780; Richman, 2003 at 756–794.
12Richman, 2003 at 756–794.
13See, e.g., Luna/Wade, 2010 at 1467–68; Laurin, 2014 at 817 (noting some recent departures
from the traditional practice under which prosecutors do not oversee police investigations).
14See, e.g., Gershowitz/ Killinger, 2011 at 261.
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Courts provide a level of oversight over police conduct. With respect to searches
and seizures, magistrate judges review warrant applications to ensure that these are
based on probable cause. Magistrates reject warrant applications extremely rarely,
however, causing some to argue that they are mere “rubber stamps for law
enforcement.”15 On the other hand, the requirement to submit a warrant application
may serve a valuable function on its own, causing police departments to invest in
training their ofﬁcers in constitutional criminal procedure and encouraging ofﬁcers
to consider the facts and the law more carefully before applying for a warrant.
In most arrests and searches, ofﬁcers are not required to obtain a warrant. But
even where no warrant is required before an arrest, magistrates must review the
decision to detain a suspect within 48 hours of the arrest. Likewise, even where no
warrant is required for a search, the defendant may challenge the legality of the
search through a pretrial motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of an
unlawful search or seizure. Defendants may also move the court to exclude a
confession that is involuntary or unreliable, or was obtained in violation ofMiranda
or the pretrial right to counsel. The exclusion of evidence continues to be regarded
by most commentators as the most effective mechanism for holding police
accountable for their investigative actions. As Sect. 3.3 discusses, however, the
Supreme Court has become more skeptical of the usefulness of the exclusionary
rule and has gradually restricted its scope.16 Indeed, the Court has limited the
application of the rule in part because of a concern that in many cases, it interferes
with the search for truth.
Beyond examining the legality of searches, arrests, and interrogations, judges
could theoretically probe more deeply into the accuracy and completeness of
investigations when they review charges at a preliminary hearing or on a defen-
dant’s motion to dismiss the indictment. Judges could also scrutinize the quality of
the investigation when they examine whether a guilty plea is based on sufﬁcient
facts. In practice, however, judges have little information at their disposal about
how an investigation has been conducted because they do not have access to an
“investigative ﬁle.” As a consequence, their ability to review the investigation for
accuracy and completeness is limited in practice. Separation of powers principles
further discourage judges from inquiring into investigative or charging decisions.17
When it comes to police misconduct during an investigation, a few other
methods of accountability are potentially available. If police ofﬁcers violate a
person’s constitutional rights, the person may bring a civil action requesting
15Saltzburg/Capra, 2014 at 108 (quoting Labaton, ‘Before the Explosion, Ofﬁcial Saw Little Risk
for Building in Oklahoma City’, New York Times, 2 May 1995, A19).
16See below Sect. 3.3.
17United States v. Janis, 428 US 433, 458–59 (1976) (noting that separation of powers principles
limit judicial supervision of police misconduct); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 US 362 (1976) (same);
Payner v. United States, 447 US 774, 737–38 (1980) (Chief Justice Burger, concurring); see also
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 US 357, 364–65 (1978) (noting the breadth of prosecutorial charging
discretion).
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monetary compensation for damages. Civil actions have not proven very effective
in disciplining police, however, for several reasons. First, ofﬁcers are entitled to
qualiﬁed immunity for their actions done in the course of performing ofﬁcial duties,
so they can be held liable only if their conduct violates clearly established con-
stitutional rules, a standard that is difﬁcult to meet.18 Second, damages for an
unlawful search are generally nominal, which discourages citizens from pursuing a
lawsuit. Third, even where damages may be more substantial, plaintiffs have dif-
ﬁculty collecting the judgment, because individual ofﬁcers are typically unable to
pay, and governmental entities employing the ofﬁcers are only liable where the
injury resulted from the entity’s custom or policy.19 Finally, civil actions typically
concern violations of privacy or the use of excessive force, so they do little to
improve reliable factﬁnding by police.
Ofﬁcers may also be subject to discipline by external oversight mechanisms
(citizen review boards) or internal ones (internal affairs investigators). Over a
hundred departments around the country are at least partially supervised by review
boards or commissions staffed by ordinary citizens, and these have increased the
transparency and legitimacy of police work.20 Yet statistics from citizen review
boards suggests that they are “more reluctant to second-guess ofﬁcers than are
ofﬁcers themselves.”21 Moreover, they focus on resolving citizen complaints about
police misconduct, which typically relate to excessive force, discourtesy, or inva-
sions of privacy, rather than on unreliable factﬁnding.
Compared to citizen review boards, internal affairs divisions are more willing to
impose discipline for ofﬁcer misconduct.22 Unfortunately, scholars have not yet
examined what makes internal affairs divisions effective, or the extent to which they
have improved police accountability since the 1960s.23 Nor is it clear whether
internal discipline, without an exclusionary rule as a backstop, could be effective on
its own to deter misconduct. A study from California, where state constitutional law
prohibits warrantless searches of trash placed on the curbside, but where exclusion
for violations of this rule was abandoned in 1982, suggests that without exclusion,
compliance with the underlying law suffers signiﬁcantly.24 More empirical research
is needed to examine whether internal discipline can operate effectively in the
absence of judicial remedies such as exclusion.
Furthermore, internal disciplinary mechanisms have focused on limiting the
use of force, improving police-citizen interactions, and preventing unwarranted
18See, e.g., Sklansky, 2008 at 572.
19Saltzburg/Capra, 2014 at 558 (citing Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 US 658
(1978)).
20Finn, 2001 at 7–12; Sklansky, 2008 at 573.
21Sklansky, 2008 at 573.
22Ibid.
23Ibid.; see also Schwartz, 2012 at 870 (“[N]o outside reviewer has ‘found the operations of
internal affairs divisions in any of the major US cities satisfactory.’”).
24Sklansky, 2008 at 580–81.
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invasions of privacy.25 They have not directly addressed the problems of incom-
plete or inaccurate investigations. An important obstacle to accuracy in investiga-
tions is the increased emphasis on efﬁciency as a goal of police departments. An
emphasis on arrests and clearance rates encourages ofﬁcers to clear cases quickly
and discourages them from investigating more thoroughly and from following up
on potentially exculpatory evidence.26 Of particular relevance to this report, ofﬁcers
have a strong incentive to obtain confessions so as to save the signiﬁcant resources
needed to investigate the case independently.27 Examination of wrongful conviction
cases shows that once ofﬁcers have obtained a confession, they rarely investigate
further.28 This increases the risk that a wrongful confession remains uncorrected.
3 General Framework for Fact-Finding in Criminal
Proceedings
3.1 Law Relating to the Search for Truth
In the United States, neither the Constitution nor criminal procedure codes
expressly require investigators, prosecutors, or courts to seek truth.29 Yet U.S.
courts and policymakers have recognized that accurate factﬁnding helps ensure the
legitimacy of the verdict and the effective enforcement of criminal law. Numerous
court decisions mention the search for truth as a guiding principle in criminal
cases.30
In pursuit of this goal, jurisdictions have adopted a range of evidence rules that
aim to sort reliable from unreliable evidence. Accurate factﬁnding is often stated as
an overarching goal of evidence rules. For example, the Federal Rules of Evidence
are supposed to “be construed so as to administer every proceeding fairly, eliminate
25See, e.g., Schwartz, 2012 at 870.
26Fisher, 1993 at 20–21.
27Fisher/Rosen-Zvi, 2008 at 878–79.
28Ibid. at 879; see also Garrett, 2012 at 35.
29For example, the Federal Criminal Procedure Rules suggest that the following principles should
guide interpretation: “These rules are to be interpreted to provide for the just determination of
every criminal proceeding, to secure simplicity in procedure and fairness in administration, and to
eliminate unjustiﬁable expense and delay.” Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rule 2 of 1
December 2016 as amended).
30For example, in Tehan v. United States, the US Supreme Court stated that “[t]he basic purpose of
a trial is the determination of the truth.” 383 US 406, 416 (1966); see also United States v. Havens,
446 US 620, 626 (1980) (“arriving at the truth is a fundamental goal of our legal system”);
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 US 157, 166 (1986) (“[T]he central purpose of a criminal trial is to
decide the factual question of the defendant’s guilt or innocence,” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475
US 673, 681 (1986), “and while we have previously held that exclusion of evidence may be
necessary to protect constitutional guarantees, both the necessity for the collateral inquiry and the
exclusion of evidence deflect a criminal trial from its basic purpose.”).
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unjustiﬁable expense and delay, and promote the development of evidence law, to
the end of ascertaining the truth and securing a just determination.”31 U.S. juris-
dictions have also adopted special evidentiary safeguards to ensure the reliability of
confessions admitted at trial. Some states require prosecutors to offer evidence
corroborating the confessions before they can obtain a conviction32; other states and
the federal system require judges to examine the trustworthiness of the confession
and admit the confession only if it is found to be reliable by preponderance of the
evidence.33
The commitment to an accurate determination of the facts is not absolute,
however, and at times bends to other goals of the criminal justice system. The
pursuit of efﬁciency, for example, has resulted in speedier resolutions of cases and
less thorough and careful examination of the underlying facts. Over 95% of con-
victions in the United States today result from guilty pleas, which substitute con-
sensual disposition of the case for an objective and thorough inquiry into the facts.
Although judges must evaluate whether guilty pleas are voluntary, informed, and
factually based, the “factual basis” requirement is very permissive. Under the
pressure of heavy caseloads, judges typically conduct merely a cursory review of
the facts, requiring little more than the defendant’s conﬁrmation that the allegations
in the indictment are correct.34 In practice, courts and prosecutors frequently
compromise the commitment to comprehensive fact-ﬁnding in order to obtain the
efﬁciency beneﬁts of guilty pleas.
Of greater relevance to this report, factﬁnding may also be constrained to some
degree by protections of individual rights. The Privilege against Self-Incrimination,
the ban on double jeopardy, rules for excluding unlawfully obtained evidence, and
unreviewable jury acquittals may impair the search for truth. This interference with
truthseeking is justiﬁed by reference to fundamental values, such as liberty, privacy,
dignity, and fairness, which are expressly or implicitly incorporated in constitu-
tional provisions.
In addition, the constraint on factﬁnding imposed by some of these constitutional
provisions—notably, the Privilege against Self-Incrimination—may be justiﬁed by
an underlying commitment to minimize particular types of erroneous outcomes—
namely, wrongful convictions. In other words, following the Blackstone maxim that
“it is better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer,” the
Privilege against Self-Incrimination may be read to be specially concerned with
avoiding one type of inaccuracy—wrongful convictions—even at the expense of an
overall increase in erroneous outcomes.35
31Federal Rules of Evidence (Rule 102 of 1 December 2015 as amended).
32See, e.g., Arkansas Code § 16-89-111(d); Fisher/Rosen-Zvi, 2008 at 885.
33See, e.g., Fisher/Rosen-Zvi, 2008 at 886; see also Opper v. United States, 348 US 84, 90-93
(1954) (requiring substantial corroboration of confession).
34Brown, 2005 at 1611; Turner, 2006 at 212–23.
35For a more thorough discussion of this concern with error allocation, see, for example, Stacy,
1991, at 1406–09.
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Section 3.2 discusses these constitutional provisions in greater detail, and
Sect. 3.3 examines how courts have balanced the need to protect individual rights
against the interest in uncovering the truth and ensuring the effective enforcement of
the criminal law.
3.2 Law Protecting Individual Rights
The Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution contain key
provisions safeguarding individual rights in the criminal process. This part of the
report focuses on aspects of the amendments that could give rise to exclusion of
evidence and therefore may potentially conflict with the search for truth.
The Fourth Amendment protects “the people” from unreasonable searches and
seizures. The Amendment also regulates the conditions on which warrants must be
issued—they must be approved by a neutral magistrate, be based on probable cause,
and particularly describe the place to be searched and the evidence to be seized. The
Court has held that searches of houses and non-public arrests of individuals are
presumed to be unreasonable unless they are conducted pursuant to a warrant.36
When it comes to searches of persons, cars, and other effects, courts have carved
out exceptions to the warrant requirement, although the reasonableness requirement
still applies.37
Two other important provisions protecting individual rights in the criminal
process are the Fifth Amendment’s Privilege against Self-Incrimination and the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The former provides that no person
should be compelled to be a witness against himself in a criminal case. The latter
guarantees that no one shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law. Due process is held to require a fair opportunity for a suspect to test
the prosecution’s case and to prohibit “inquisitorial” methods of investigation.38
Courts have relied on these provisions to regulate the methods by which police can
obtain confessions and to exclude confessions obtained through torture or
coercion.39
36See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 US 27, 40 (2001); Payton v. New York, 445 US 573, 586–
88 (1980).
37See, e.g., California v. Carney, 471 US 386, 392–93 (1985) (warrantless search of car); United
States v. Robinson, 414 US 218, 224 (1973) (warrantless search of person incident to arrest); Terry
v. Ohio, 392 US 1, 20 (1968) (warrantless stop & frisk); Arizona v. Gant, 556 US 332, 343 (2009)
(warrantless search of car incident to arrest); United States v. Watson, 423 US 411, 423 (1976)
(warrantless arrest of person in public); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 US 218, 219 (1973)
(warrantless consent search).
38Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 US 49, 50–51 (1962); Chambers v. Florida, 309 US 227, 237 (1940);
Watts v. Indiana, 338 US 49, 54–55 (1949).
39See below Part 4.1.
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Both the Due Process Clause and the Privilege against Self-Incrimination pro-
hibit methods of interrogation that overwhelm the will of the accused. To determine
what methods violate these provisions, courts use a totality of circumstances
approach, which focuses above all on the coerciveness of police tactics, but also
takes into account the characteristics of the accused and features of the environment
in which the interrogation took place. More recent cases have clariﬁed that personal
characteristics of the suspect do not on their own render a confession invalid, absent
some proof of police coercion.40
While an important concern about coerced confessions—from the common law
rule preventing involuntary confessions until today—has been that they may be
unreliable, police coercion appears to be the preeminent reason for suppressing
involuntary confessions under contemporary constitutional doctrine. The Supreme
Court has clariﬁed that coercion may lead to exclusion even in situations where no
question about the reliability of the confession exists: “The abhorrence of society to
the use of involuntary confessions does not turn alone on their inherent untrust-
worthiness. It also turns on the deep-rooted feeling that the police must obey the
law while enforcing the law.”41 Conversely, in the absence of police coercion, lack
of reliability would be addressed under state or federal rules of evidence (potentially
also leading to exclusion), rather than under the Constitution.42
The Fifth Amendment’s Privilege against Self-Incrimination also prohibits lesser
compulsion of a person, but only in the context of ofﬁcial proceedings. The priv-
ilege protects individuals from answering questions in any ofﬁcial process,
including civil, legislative, or administrative proceedings, if the answers might harm
the persons in future criminal proceedings.43 The level of compulsion needed to
trigger this protection under the privilege is lower than that which renders a con-
fession coerced in the context of police interrogations. While the threat of
imprisonment or being held in contempt of court is the classic type of compulsion
prohibited under the privilege, lesser compulsion may also sufﬁce. For example, the
threat of imposing economic sanctions for invoking the privilege is often enough.
Economic sanctions may include the denial of government contracts44; disbar-
ment45; or dismissal from employment.46 Somewhat more controversially, the
Supreme Court has also held that a comment, by the prosecutor or the court, on the
defendant’s invocation of the privilege also constitutes ofﬁcial compulsion that
violates the privilege.
40Colorado v. Connelly, 479 US 157, 163 (1986). Thus, where a defendant confesses because he
suffers from command hallucinations telling him to confess, or where a private party coerces the
defendant to give a statement, this does not render the statement involuntary under the Due Process
Clause.
41Spano v. New York, 360 US 315, 320 (1959).
42Colorado v. Connelly, 479 US 157, 159 (1986).
43See, e.g., Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 US 70, 77 (1973).
44Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 US 70, 82–83 (1973).
45Spevack v. Klein, 385 US 511, 516 (1967).
46Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 US 493, 500 (1967).
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In its famous ruling inMiranda v. Arizona, the U.S. Supreme Court extended the
reach of the privilege further and held that the coercive environment of pretrial
custodial interrogations constitutes the type of compulsion that has the potential to
overwhelm the will of the accused. To dispel this coercive effect, before interro-
gation, ofﬁcers must warn detained suspects of their right not to make a statement,
of the risk that any statement can be used as evidence against them, of the right to
consult a lawyer, and of the right to have an attorney appointed for them, if they
cannot afford to retain one. After receiving the warnings, suspects may choose to
waive their rights to remain silent and to have a lawyer present during the inter-
rogation. The waiver must, however, be intelligent, knowing, and voluntary.
After a suspect has been formally charged, the Sixth Amendment right to an
attorney attaches and governs interactions between the accused and government
agents. Police may not deliberately elicit statements from an indicted defendant
without providing the requisite warnings of the right to remain silent and to consult
an attorney and then obtaining a valid waiver.47 The Sixth Amendment applies to
undercover investigations as well, prohibiting the surreptitious elicitation of state-
ments from an accused.
To enforce these rules contained in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments,
courts frequently rely on evidentiary exclusion. Exclusion is justiﬁed on somewhat
different grounds and has a different scope depending on which underlying rule is
violated. It is automatic for statements taken in violation of the Due Process Clause
or the Privilege against Self-Incrimination. When a statement is coerced under these
provisions, it cannot be introduced at trial for any purpose, and even fruits of the
statement are generally suppressed. Exclusion is not automatic, however, for vio-
lations of the Fourth Amendment, of the rules announced in Miranda v. Arizona,
and of the ban on deliberate elicitation under the Sixth Amendment. The consti-
tutional text does not expressly mandate exclusion as a remedy in these cases, and
the Court has held that there are typically no reliability concerns for the evidence at
issue.
Evidentiary exclusion was originally adopted because it was seen as necessary to
effectuate constitutional guarantees inscribed in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendments. Without exclusion, the Court held in an early Fourth Amendment
case, provisions that protect fundamental rights would be reduced to “a form of
words”48 such that they “might as well be stricken from the Constitution.”49
Most of the time, however, the Court has justiﬁed exclusion on the grounds that
it helps discourage misconduct by police ofﬁcers. Under this view, the “[exclu-
sionary] rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is to deter—to
compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available
47Massiah v. United States, 377 US 201, 205 (1964); Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 US 778, 786–87
(2009).
48Silverthome Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 US 385, 392 (1920).
49Weeks v. United States, 232 US 383, 393 (1914). In the early days of the exclusionary rule, the
Court also put forward judicial integrity as a reason for exclusion. Under this view, excluding
unlawfully obtained evidence is necessary to protect the court from the taint of ofﬁcial illegality.
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way—by removing the incentive to disregard it.”50 More recently, the Court has
extrapolated from this focus on deterrence that the exclusionary rule should be used
only when it would effectively dissuade law enforcement ofﬁcials from violating the
law in the future.51 If the deterrence potential of the rule is too negligible or if it is
vastly outweighed by the costs of the exclusionary rule, then exclusion should not
be imposed.52
3.3 Law Balancing the Search for Truth and Individual
Rights Protections
While U.S. courts mandate exclusion with respect to conduct that violates the Due
Process Clause or the Privilege against Self-Incrimination, this is not always the
case with respect to other constitutional violations in the investigative process. U.S.
courts balance the costs and beneﬁts of excluding evidence in certain cases
involving Fourth Amendment violations, violations of Miranda v. Arizona, and
violations of the Sixth Amendment pretrial right to counsel. The balancing process
is not done on a case-by-case basis, but is rather done on a category-by-category
basis. In other words, if the costs of exclusion for certain categories of evidence of
for certain uses of the evidence outweigh the beneﬁts, then exclusion is never
imposed for that type or that use of evidence.
In the Fourth Amendment context, the conflict between truth-seeking and
individual rights is expressly acknowledged in exclusionary rule decisions. In
deciding whether to mandate exclusion for certain categories of evidence, the
Supreme Court balances the beneﬁts of exclusion—deterrence of police misconduct
and protection of individual rights, against the costs of exclusion—interference with
truthﬁnding and with the enforcement of criminal law.53 For example, the Court has
held that at certain preliminary or non-criminal proceedings, such as grand jury,
sentencing, deportation, or habeas, the likelihood of deterring police misconduct is
too negligible to warrant exclusion of reliable evidence obtained in violation of the
Fourth Amendment.54 As the Court has explained in the context of grand jury
proceedings, “[a]ny incremental deterrent effect which might be achieved by
extending the [exclusionary] rule to grand jury proceedings is uncertain at best. …
Such an extension would deter only police investigation consciously directed
toward the discovery of evidence solely for use in a grand jury investigation.”55
50Elkins v. United States, 364 US 206, 217 (1960).
51United States v. Leon, 468 US 897, 918 (1984); Hudson v. Michigan, 547 US 586, 591 (2006);
Herring v. United States, 555 US 135 (2009).
52See, e.g., Herring v. United States, 555 US 135, 141, 144 (2009).
53United States v. Leon, 468 US 897, 907 (1984); Hudson v. Michigan, 547 US 586, 591, 599
(2006); Herring v. United States, 555 US 135, 141 (2009).
54See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 US 338, 347 (1974).
55Ibid. at 351.
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Applying the exclusionary rule in the grand jury and non-criminal contexts would
achieve a merely “speculative and undoubtedly minimal advance in the deterrence
of police misconduct,” and yet it would come at the expense of the ability of the
grand jury or civil factﬁnders to uncover the truth.56 Therefore, balancing the costs
and beneﬁts has led the Court to deny Fourth Amendment exclusion in these
contexts.
A similar balancing exercise has led the Court to allow the introduction of
unlawfully obtained evidence to impeach the defendant’s credibility. The incre-
mental deterrent beneﬁt in such cases is said to be small: “[T]he deterrent function
of the rules excluding unconstitutionally obtained evidence is sufﬁciently served by
denying its use to the government on its direct case.”57 The minimal incremental
beneﬁt served by forbidding the use of unlawfully obtained evidence to impeach the
defendant is outweighed by the costs of allowing perjured testimony to stand
uncorrected and impairing the integrity of the factﬁnding process.58 Accordingly,
evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, Miranda, or Sixth
Amendment can be admitted for purposes of impeaching the defendant’s
credibility.59
Additionally, the Court has limited the group of people who can invoke the
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. Only those whose Fourth Amendment rights
have been violated can ask for exclusion of evidence; the rule cannot be asserted
vicariously. The Court justiﬁed this limitation in large part by pointing to the
signiﬁcant costs of excluding evidence:
Each time the exclusionary rule is applied it exacts a substantial social cost for the vin-
dication of Fourth Amendment rights. Relevant and reliable evidence is kept from the trier
of fact and the search for truth at trial is deflected […]. Since our cases generally have held
that one whose Fourth Amendment rights are violated may successfully suppress evidence
obtained in the course of an illegal search and seizure, misgivings as to the beneﬁt of
enlarging the class of persons who may invoke that rule are properly considered when
deciding whether to expand standing to assert Fourth Amendment violations.60
As subsequent sections elaborate, similar standing limitations on exclusion
likely apply with respect to other constitutional violations as well, including vio-
lations of the Fifth Amendment and the Due Process Clause.
Although the Court has generally extended the Fourth Amendment exclusionary
rule to “fruits” of the original violation, it has also placed some limits on how far
the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine extends. For example, if the connection
56Ibid. at 351–52.
57United States v. Havens, 446 US 620, 626 (1980).
58Ibid. at 627.
59Ibid.; Harris v. New York, 401 US 222, 225–26 (1971); Kansas v. Ventris, 556 US 586, 593–94
(2009).
60Rakas v. Illinois, 439 US 128, 137–38 (1978).
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between the original violation and the derivative evidence is too attenuated (e.g., if
an event has broken the chain of causation between the original illegality and the
derivative evidence), then the derivative evidence can be admitted.61 Furthermore,
if the police would inevitably have discovered the evidence, even absent the con-
stitutional violation, then the exclusionary rule does not apply.62 Once again, the
Court has justiﬁed these restrictions on the exclusionary rule by pointing to the high
costs of excluding probative evidence and the limited deterrent effect of excluding
evidence that either has been or would have been discovered independently by
lawful means.63 As discussed in more detail later in the report, these limitations on
the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine likely apply to violations of the Fifth
Amendment, Due Process Clause, and the Sixth Amendment.64
In more recent Fourth Amendment exclusion cases, the Supreme Court has also
considered the availability of alternative sanctions, which may be able to discipline
ofﬁcers at a lesser cost to the administration of justice.65 To the extent that such
alternative sanctions are viable, exclusion is less likely to be ordered. The Court
also examines whether police misconduct is an isolated occurrence or part of a
pattern, under the theory that systemic abuses are in greater need of deterrence.66
Finally, the Court considers ofﬁcers’ state of mind in committing a violation and
reserves discipline only for reckless or deliberate breaches of the law.67 Therefore,
ofﬁcers’ reasonable, good faith reliance on a warrant, a statute, or a court decision
will not give rise to exclusion, even where the warrant is subsequently found to be
defective or mistakenly entered into a database after expungement,68 the statute is
held unconstitutional,69 or the court decision is overruled.70 On the other hand,
61Brown v. Illinois, 422 US 590, 603–04 (1975); Murray v. United States, 487 US 533, 537
(1988).
62Nix v. Williams, 467 US 431, 444 (1984).
63“If the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information
ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means — here the volunteers’
search— then the deterrence rationale has so little basis that the evidence should be received. The
requirement that the prosecution must prove the absence of bad faith … wholly fails to take into
account the enormous societal cost of excluding truth in the search for truth in the administration
of justice.” Nix v. Williams, 467 US 431, 444–45 (1984).
64When it comes to Miranda violations, evidence derived from the original violation is almost
never excluded, for reasons discussed below Part 4.3.
65Hudson v. Michigan, 547 US 586, 591, 599 (2006).
66Herring v. United States, 555 US 135, 144 (2009).
67Ibid. at 144.
68United States v. Leon, 468 US 897 (1984); Herring v. United States, 555 US 135, 142 (2009).
69Illinois v. Krull, 480 US 340, 349–50 (1987).
70Davis v. United States, 564 US 229, 241 (2011).
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good faith has not been used to limit exclusion of statements obtained in violation
of the Fifth and Sixth Amendment or the Due Process Clause,71 but it has limited
exclusion under Miranda to some degree.72
In general, the exclusionary rule has been weakest and most likely to be sub-
ordinated to the interest in truthseeking when it comes to statements obtained in
violation ofMiranda safeguards. The Court has justiﬁed restrictions on exclusion in
this setting by noting that Miranda sets out a broad prophylactic rule that sweeps
more broadly than the Privilege against Self-Incrimination itself.73 Miranda-
defective statements are therefore not presumed to be unreliable.74 And unlike the
admission of coerced statements, the admission of Miranda-defective statements at
trial is not considered to be compulsion of a person in direct violation of the
Constitution. Furthermore, the Court has held that the beneﬁts of deterring police
violation of Miranda are frequently outweighed by the cost of excluding reliable
evidence—for example, when Miranda-defective statements are introduced for
impeachment, when fruits of Miranda violation are at issue, and when an ofﬁcer
fails to give Miranda warnings based on a reasonable belief that public safety
requires him or her to dispense with the warnings. The scope of the Miranda
exclusionary rule is considered in greater detail in Sect. 4.3 below.
In brief, the Supreme Court has considered the tradeoff between truthseeking and
evidentiary exclusion in a number of cases. In cases where the Constitution does not
expressly mandate exclusion, the Court has done a category-by-category analysis of
the costs and beneﬁts of the exclusionary rule in deciding whether to impose it. This
has created a patchwork of rules that apply differently depending on the rule that is
violated, the nature of the evidence being considered, and the use to which the
evidence would be put at trial.
3.4 Social Relevance of Truth and Individual Rights
in Criminal Trials
3.4.1 Relevance of Determining the Truth
As discussed in Sect. 3.1, the goal of seeking truth in criminal cases is not expressly
mentioned in the U.S. Constitution or criminal procedure codes. Nonetheless,
numerous court decisions mention it as a guiding principle. The search for truth is
considered important for the effective enforcement of the criminal law and for the
71See below Parts 4.1–4.2.
72See below Part 4.3 (discussing public safety exception to Miranda, as well as the relevance of
good faith to exclusion of statements derived from earlier Miranda-defective statements).
73See, e.g., United States v. Patane, 542 US 630, 639 (2004).
74See, e.g.,Mincey v. Arizona, 437 US 385, 397–98 (1978) (involuntary confession cannot be used
even for impeachment purposes as it is more likely to be unreliable and the police action in
question is more outrageous and therefore in greater need of discipline).
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pursuit of justice more generally. As DNA testing has revealed a high incidence of
wrongful convictions, reliable factﬁnding has become a topic of public discussion and
concern. There is growing recognition that the public legitimacy of the criminal justice
system depends at least in part on the ability of the system to attain accurate outcomes.
3.4.2 Presentation of Factﬁnding to the Public
To increase the transparency and reliability of factﬁnding, a number of U.S.
jurisdictions have recently taken measures to record critical stages of the criminal
process. Police departments are increasingly recording police-citizen interactions on
the street, custodial interrogations, and identiﬁcation procedures. Some courts are in
turn allowing the recording and even broadcasting of trial proceedings. Beyond
improving reliability, such recording is regarded as helping to improve the fairness
and public legitimacy of the proceedings.
Recording of interrogations is seen as particularly useful in preventing invol-
untary and false confessions. It is said to reduce the risk that police would use
coercive tactics to obtain statements, to provide a more transparent record for courts
to evaluate the voluntariness and reliability of confessions, and to offer a more
accurate and thorough transcription of the defendant’s statements for use at trial.75
For all these reasons, a growing number of U.S. jurisdictions now require the
recording of interrogations.76
While police ofﬁcers were initially concerned that taping would reduce suspects’
willingness to confess, early evidence from jurisdictions that have adopted taping
policies suggests that the risk of lost confessions is not signiﬁcant. While one early
study reported that suspects were less willing to talk when they knew they were being
recorded,77 more recent research has found no decrease in confessions that can be
attributed to the taping of interrogations.78 Even the study that found a small drop in
confessions also reported incidental beneﬁts of recording, such as “better preparation
by detectives and better monitoring of detectives’ work by supervisors.”79
Police-citizen interactions outside the police station are also increasingly being
recorded on body or dashboard cameras employed by police ofﬁcers.80 Public
discussion has emphasized how recording of these interactions can help reduce
police violence, as well as unwarranted complaints against police. Recording also
helps preserve evidence for use in subsequent prosecution and thus contributes to
the search for truth. On the other hand, without careful regulation, recording may
75Fisher/Rosen-Zvi, 2008 at 888.
76Taslitz, 2012 at 409 (acknowledging trend but adding that “the vast majority of police depart-
ments still do not record” interrogations).
77Ibid.
78Leo, 2008 at 303.
79Miller/Wright, 2007 at 643 (citing Geller, 1993).
80Miller et al., 2014.
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interfere with the privacy interests of citizens captured on camera. The cost of
recording, storing, and reviewing the massive amounts of data is also a serious
concern weighing against the broad use of body cameras.81
When it comes to the recording and broadcasting of trials, rules vary signiﬁ-
cantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Some U.S. jurisdictions categorically ban
televising trials, others expressly permit it, while yet others have no speciﬁc rules
and leave the decision to the discretion of the court. For example, Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 53 prohibits the broadcasting of judicial proceedings in crim-
inal cases. Courts have upheld the constitutionality of the rule against First
Amendment challenges.82 Florida permits the broadcasting of all trials, including
criminal trials, under guidelines to ensure the fair administration of justice.83 In
Texas, no speciﬁc rule governs the broadcasting of criminal trials, but trial courts
have occasionally permitted such broadcasting based on their own discretion to
control the conduct of the proceedings.84 The propriety of the judge’s orders is then
analysed for its consistency with the Due Process Clause.
The televising of trials affects a number of interests,whichmay at times be in conflict
with one another: the fair trial of the defendant, witness rights, First Amendment rights
of the media, and the interests in judicial integrity and efﬁciency. The U.S. Supreme
Court, in Chandler v. Florida, held that broadcasting of criminal trials might in some
circumstances violate the Due Process Clause but that it does not inherently do so. To
mount a successful Due Process challenge, a defendant must show that broadcasting in
his speciﬁc case is likely to adversely impact the fairness of his trial. The defendant may
succeed in his challenge if he demonstrates that coveragewould compromise the ability
of the jury to judgehim fairlyorwould adversely affect the participants inhis trial to such
a degree as to constitute a denial of due process.
Some state rules also attempt to address other concerns raised by televising trials.
For example, California rules on televising trials lay out certain requirements
concerning the type of equipment to be used to minimize disruption of the pro-
ceedings.85 California courts also often prohibit the broadcasting of witness testi-
mony to prevent concerns about the safety of witnesses and their willingness to
testify.86 Other rules balance such interests against First Amendment rights to
broadcast trials of public signiﬁcance.87
81Ibid.
82See, e.g., United States v. Moussaoui, 205 FRD 183, 185 (2002); United States v. Edwards, 785
F 2d 1293, 1295–96 (5th Cir. 1986).
83Florida Rules of Judicial Administration, Rule 2.450. Broadcasting was ﬁrst regulated by the
Florida Supreme Court in In re Petition of Post-Newsweek Stations Fla., Inc., 370 So 2d 764 (Fla.
1979) (laying out standards for broadcasting of criminal trials).
84See, e.g., Wright v. State, 374 SW 3d 564 (Tex.App.—Houston [14 Dist.], 2012).
852013 California Rules of Court Rule 1.150 (e)(8).
86See, e.g., KFMB-TV Channel 8 v. Municipal Court, 221 Cal App 3d 1362, 1364 (Cal. App. 4 Dist.
1990); Judicial Council of California, Administrative Ofﬁce of the Courts, 2007 at 2–3.
87In re Petition of Post-Newsweek Stations Fla., Inc., 370 So 2d 764 (Fla. 1979).
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In summary, while recording of interrogations and police-citizen interactions is
broadly advocated and increasingly adopted by U.S. states and localities, televising
trials is not regarded as critical to improving the accuracy and fairness of the
criminal process. Indeed, it is sometimes said to conflict with these goals, as when a
witness is discouraged from testifying truthfully or when broadcasting prejudices or
distracts the jury. Accordingly, policymakers and commentators have been less
ardent about introducing the broadcasting of trials than about the recording of
interrogations and other citizen-police interactions.
3.4.3 Public Discussion of Miscarriages of Justice
In the 1990s, DNA testing became more broadly available and led to the ﬁrst
exonerations of wrongfully convicted individuals. The Innocence Project, founded
initially at Cardozo Law School, helped numerous defendants obtain DNA testing
and prove their innocence. Over the years, the Innocence Project transformed into a
nationwide movement, which included Innocence clinics at law schools across the
country, Conviction Integrity Units within prosecutor’s ofﬁces, and Innocence
Review Commissions. The work of the Innocence Movement has given rise to
broad public discussion of miscarriages of justice, and the problem of wrongful
convictions has been highlighted in popular culture, TV shows, movies, and
books.88
Most relevant to this report, the Innocence Movement has shed light on the
problem of unreliable confessions. The Innocence Project has reported that 27% of
the ﬁrst 325 wrongful convictions were based at least in part on a false confession.
Another study of wrongful convictions, by Brandon Garrett, found that forty of the
ﬁrst 250 people exonerated through DNA (16%) made a false confession.89 Garrett
closely examined the features of the false confessions in these cases and found
several common elements. First, almost all of these confessions were quite detailed
and contained information about the crime that only the true suspect and the
investigating ofﬁcers could have known.90 Given the subsequent exoneration of the
defendants, the only plausible explanation for these confessions is that the police,
whether intentionally or accidentally, fed information about the crime to the sus-
pect. Moreover, psychological coercion, including trickery, was brought to bear on
the suspects to force them to confess to a crime they did not commit. Notably, a
high number of the innocent defendants who confessed were mentally retarded,
mentally ill, or juveniles, making them particularly susceptible to psychological
88Garrett, 2012 at 6.
89Ibid. at 18.
90Ibid. at 19–20.
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pressure.91 Another remarkable fact is that in the majority of the false confession
cases, the interrogations were partially recorded, whether by audio or video.92 But
the recordings typically included only the ﬁnal confession, not what came before.93
Finally, in a number of the cases, police stopped investigating once they obtained a
confession, which meant that they failed to unearth critical inconsistencies in the
evidence.94
Public discussion of the sources of wrongful convictions, including contami-
nated and coerced confessions, has led to calls for reform across the country. Most
notably, as discussed in the previous Section, it has encouraged a number of
jurisdictions to introduce mandatory recording of interrogations in order to reduce
the risk of unreliable confessions.95
4 Constitutional Limitations on the Admissibility
of Confessions in Criminal Proceedings
4.1 Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Limits
on Admissibility of Confessions
Confessions in the United States were originally regulated exclusively by common
law. Under the common law, two principles prohibited the admission of coerced
confessions. The “nemo tenetur” principle prohibited the use of torture and coercion
by government agents to force individuals to incriminate themselves.96 The vol-
untariness doctrine prohibited the use of involuntary confessions because such
confessions were presumed to be unreliable.97
In 1897, the Supreme Court for the ﬁrst time relied on the Constitution to
exclude a statement in Bram v. United States. It held that the common-law rule
banning the admission of involuntary confessions was “embedded in the Fifth
Amendment” Privilege against Self-Incrimination and that the privilege thus pre-
cluded the admission of compelled statements.98 This new constitutional rule
applied only in federal court, however, as the Supreme Court had not yet applied





95See above Part 3.4.2.
96Tomkovicz, 2011 at 64; Godsey, 2005 at 479–80.
97Hopt v. Utah, 110 US 574 (1884); Tomkovicz, 2011 at 64; Godsey, 2005 at 482.
98Bram v. United States, 168 US 532, 548 (1897).
99Twining v. New Jersey, 211 US 78 (1908). The Fifth Amendment was ﬁrst applied to the states
in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 US 1 (1964).
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Amendment rule did not have a broad impact, as the vast majority of criminal cases
were brought at the state level.
The ﬁrst time that the Supreme Court held that a confession obtained by state
ofﬁcials was unconstitutional was in 1936, in Brown v. Mississippi.100 The use of
physical violence to extract confessions was “widespread throughout the country” at
the time.101 In Brown, the confessions were obtained through particularly heinous
and brutal acts—repeated mock lynching, beatings, and other degrading treatment.
The Court held that the methods used to obtain confessions were “revolting to the
sense of justice.”102 Accordingly, using the coerced confessions as evidence at trial
was “a clear denial of due process” and a violation of the Constitution.103
In the following three decades, the Court continued to rely on the Due Process
Clause to evaluate the admissibility of confessions obtained through coercive
methods. In 1964, the Court explained that the Fifth Amendment Privilege against
Self-Incrimination likewise prohibited coerced confessions and that the standards
for evaluating extrajudicial confessions under the Due Process Clause and the
privilege were identical.104 In deciding whether a confession is coerced under these
provisions, the Court applies a totality of circumstances test to determine whether
the confession was voluntarily given. The Court examines the personal character-
istics of the accused (education level, age, mental state, etc.),105 as well as physical
or psychological coercion applied by the authorities.106 Physical coercion includes
violence as well as food or sleep deprivation,107 while psychological pressure
includes threats, humiliation, isolation, trickery, and prolonged interrogation.108
The critical question is whether ofﬁcial pressure has overborne the will of the
suspect, preventing him from making a rational decision whether to confess.
In the early cases suppressing involuntary confessions, the Court emphasized the
need to condemn the coercion at issue and the concern that coerced confession are
unreliable. It further held that the admission of coerced confessions violated the U.S.
criminal justice system’s commitment to “fair state-individual balance [that requires]
the government to leave the individual alone… [and] to shoulder the entire load.”109
100297 US 278 (1936).
101National Comm’n on Law Observance and Enforcement, ‘Report on Lawlessness in
Law-Enforcement’ 1931, 3, cited in Miller/Wright, 2007 at 518.
102Brown v. Mississippi, 297 US 278, 286 (1936).
103Ibid.
104Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of New York Harbor, 378 US 52, 79–80 (1964).
105E.g., Payne v. Arkansas, 356 US 560, 567 (1958); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 US 568, 620
(1961).
106E.g., Payne v. Arkansas, 356 US 560, 567 (1958); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 US 143, 153–54
(1944); Spano v. New York, 360 US 315, 323 (1959).
107E.g., Payne v. Arkansas, 356 US 560, 567 (1958); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 US 143, 167
(1944).
108E.g., Spano v. New York, 360 US 315, 322–23 (1959); Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 US 279, 288
(1991).
109Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of New York Harbor, 378 US 52, 55 (1964).
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Over time, disapproval of offensive police tactics, rather than reliability, became
the dominant reason for excluding coerced confessions.110 In 1959, the Court stated
that “[t]he abhorrence of society to the use of involuntary confessions does not turn
alone on their inherent untrustworthiness. It also turns on the deep-rooted feeling
that the police must obey the law while enforcing the law.”111 By 1986, the Court
held that the existence of police coercion is a prerequisite for a ﬁnding that a
confession is constitutionally invalid.112 Thus a confession cannot be considered
coerced in violation of the Due Process Clause or the privilege where a suspect
faces absolutely no government influence and responds to his own “command
hallucinations.”113 Likewise, coercion by a private party does not violate the
Constitution: “If a relative of a crime victim were to torture a person until he
admitted his guilt, neither constitutional guarantee would bar that confession
[although an evidentiary rule focused on reliability might].” Suppression under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment is therefore justiﬁed primarily as necessary to
condemn and deter future police conduct. Concerns about the reliability of the
evidence are resolved by state evidentiary rules, not through constitutional
interpretation.114
By 1967, physical brutality had largely vanished from interrogation rooms. This
was in part the result of judicial scrutiny of confessions, in part a product of the
increasing professionalization of police, and in part a response to broad public
outrage at revelations of third-degree tactics.115 Yet while physical violence during
interrogations was a rare occurrence by the late 1960s, the police applied other
types of pressure to extract confessions: denial of food or sleep, protracted inter-
rogations, isolation, and various psychological ploys, including trickery.116
Some commentators have criticized the voluntariness test for failing to address
adequately these more subtle, yet nonetheless coercive tactics. Part of the difﬁculty
is that judges have to resolve, without a reliable record, competing claims of what
110Kamisar, 1995 at 939.
111Spano v. New York, 360 US 315, 320 (1959).
112Colorado v. Connelly, 479 US 157, 167 (1986).
113Ibid. at 161, 167.
114Ibid. at 159.
115Miller/Wright, 2007 at 521–22; Cassell, 1996 at 474–75.
116Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436, 447, 448 (1966). Interviews with two Texas defense attorneys
and two prosecutors suggest that although physical coercion is a thing of the past, psychological
tactics—especially lying to suspects about the evidence in the case—continue to be commonly
used. As the defense attorneys interviewed suggested, such tactics, particularly when used with
vulnerable (e.g., young or cognitively impaired) suspects, can result in false confessions. Interview
with Texas Prosecutor #1, by Jenia I. Turner, July 20, 2016, Dallas, Texas; Interview with Texas
Prosecutor #2, by Jenia I. Turner, July 27, 2016, Dallas, Texas; Interview with Texas Defense
Attorney #1, by Jenia I. Turner, August 8, 2016, Dallas, Texas; Interview with Texas Defense
Attorney #2, by Jenia I. Turner, September 20, 2016, Dallas, Texas.
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transpired in the interrogation room. Although the state bears the burden of proof to
show admissibility, in practice, courts frequently credit police accounts of the
interrogation over inconsistent accounts by the defendant.117 In addition, the vol-
untariness test has been criticized as too malleable and unpredictable, as it relies on
many different factors to determine whether a confession was involuntary.118
While courts and commentators have debated the voluntariness test and its
effectiveness, the exclusion of statements found to be involuntary has not been
contested. Courts have maintained a robust exclusionary rule, which applies to the
coerced confession and to evidence derived from it. Coerced statements cannot be
used by the prosecution for any purpose at trial—not even to impeach the defen-
dant’s credibility. Nor can coerced statements be admitted under a good-faith or
public safety exception.119 This means that even a “ticking bomb” scenario, under
which a government agent coerces a suspect to obtain evidence that he believes
would save many lives, would not permit the subsequent admission of statements
coerced from a suspect.
Fruits of a coerced confession are also generally excluded, under the theory that
such exclusion is necessary to deter police misconduct more effectively.120 But
there are some limits on the fruits doctrine with respect to coerced statements. The
prosecution may be able to introduce evidence derived from coerced confession if
the government can show that it obtained the same evidence through an indepen-
dent source, or that it would have inevitably obtained it from an independent
source.121 Additionally, the prosecution may be able to introduce fruits of the initial
involuntary statement if it can show that the taint of the initial violation was
attenuated.122 In other words, as time passes and circumstances change, the effect of
the initial coercion may dissipate to the point that a subsequent statement or other
evidence can no longer be considered to be tainted by the coercion.123
Finally, if the prosecution can show that the coerced confession is reliable, it
may be able to introduce the confession itself in evidence against a third party who
117See, e.g., Pepson/Shariﬁ, 2010 at 1228–29.
118See, e.g., Saltzburg/Capra, 2014 at 717–18.
119Mincey v. Arizona, 437 US 385, 397–98 (1978); New York v. Quarles, 467 US 649, 654 (1984)
(clarifying that “we have before us no claim that respondent’s statements were actually compelled
by police conduct which overcame his will to resist”).
120Cammack, 2013 at 23.
121See, e.g., Kastigar v. United States, 406 US 441, 460 (1972); Nix v. Williams, 467 US 431
(1984).
122See, e.g., Broun, 2013 § 159 at 875; Oregon v. Elstad, 470 US 298, 310 (1985).
123Tomkovicz, 2011 at 89.
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was not subject to coercion.124 Both the Due Process and Fifth Amendment priv-
ilege are considered personal rights, so a third party would not have “standing” to
challenge the coercion of another person.125
4.2 Sixth Amendment Limits on Admissibility
of Confessions
Because of concerns about the effectiveness of the voluntariness test, in 1964, the
Supreme Court began relying on the Sixth Amendment right to counsel as a safeguard
against coerced confessions. In Massiah v. United States, the Court invalidated a
confession obtained by a government informant after the defendant had been charged
and obtained counsel.126 It held that once a person is formally charged, he is entitled to
the assistance of counsel whenever government agents deliberately elicit any incrimi-
nating statements from him.127 The Court suggested that if an indicted defendant is
denied counsel during pretrial proceedings, he is effectively denied “effective repre-
sentation bycounsel at the only stagewhen legal aid and advicewouldhelp him.”128 In a
more recent case, the Supreme Court explained that the right to counsel is extended to
pretrial “deliberate elicitations” to ensure that the trial right to counsel is not “render[ed]
… entirely impotent” by the pretrial interrogation.129 If the government breaches the
right to counsel by eliciting statements from an indicted defendant, any statements
obtained in the process will be excluded from evidence at trial.130
The extension of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to the pretrial stage, and
the use of exclusion to enforce it, generated heated debate among the Justices in
Massiah. The dissenters were concerned about the barring of “relevant, reliable and
highly probative” evidence.131 As the dissenting Justices noted, “Without the
evidence, the quest for truth may be seriously impeded and in many cases the trial
court, although aware of proof showing defendant’s guilt, must nevertheless release
him because the crucial evidence is deemed inadmissible.”132 Because Massiah’s
statements were not coerced and communications between counsel and client were
124See Fisher v. United States, 425 US 391, 397–98 (1976); see also People v. Badgett, 10 Cal 4th
330, 343, 895 P 2d 877 (1995).
125Fisher v. United States, 425 US 391, 397–98 (1976); Tomkovicz, 2011 at 94–95.
126377 US 201 (1964).
127Ibid. at 206.
128Ibid. at 204 (quoting Spano v. New York, 360 US 315, 326 (1959) (Justice Douglas,
concurring)).
129Kansas v. Ventris, 556 US 586, 591 (2009).
130Massiah v. United States, 377 US 201, 207 (1964).
131Ibid. at 208 (Justice White, dissenting).
132Ibid.
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in no way disturbed, the extension of the exclusionary rule to statements elicited by
government agents after formal charges appeared unwarranted to the dissent.133
More recently, a majority of Supreme Court justices have revived the idea that the
Sixth Amendment ban on deliberate elicitations and the exclusionary rule that enforce
it sweep too broadly. TheCourt hasmade it easier for defendants towaive their pretrial
right to counsel134 and has carved out exceptions to the Sixth Amendment exclu-
sionary rule.135 In Kansas v. Ventris, the Court held that statements obtained in
violation of the pretrial right to counsel may be used to impeach the defendant’s
credibility if he testiﬁes at trial in a manner inconsistent with those statements.136 The
Court reasoned that the exclusionary rule in this context protects the core Sixth
Amendment right—to have counsel’s assistance at trial—only indirectly. Exclusion
is not expressly mandated by the Constitution. Moreover, the rule’s purpose is pri-
marily deterrent—to prevent future violations, rather than to remedy a violation that
has already occurred at the pretrial stage and cannot be undone.137 Conducting a
balancing analysis, the Court concluded that any deterrent beneﬁt served by extending
the exclusionary rule to cover the use of evidence for impeachment purposes is
outweighed by the interest in protecting the integrity of the trial against false state-
ments. Following a similar cost-beneﬁt analysis, some lower courts have further
limited the Sixth Amendment exclusionary rule and admitted the fruits of statements
obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment.138
The Supreme Court has yet to clarify the precise scope of the Sixth Amendment
exclusionary rule. Given the cost-beneﬁt analysis the Court used in Ventris, how-
ever, we are likely to see a further narrowing of this exclusionary rule, as we have
seen with the Fourth Amendment and the Miranda exclusionary rule (the subject of
the next Section). Like evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment
and Miranda, but unlike confessions coerced in violation of the Due Process Clause
and the Privilege against Self-Incrimination, statements elicited in contravention of
the Sixth Amendment are presumed to be reliable and probative evidence; “[t]he
fact that an accused lacked legal assistance when he made inculpatory statements in
response to noncoercive ofﬁcial inducements does not raise serious questions about
the accuracy of those statements.”139 Because exclusion of such statements is not
expressly mandated by the Constitution and stands in the way of accurate
factﬁnding, it is likely to be imposed more sparingly by the current Supreme Court,
133Ibid. at 208–10.
134Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 US 778, 786 (2009).
135Nix v. Williams, 467 US 431 (1984); Michigan v. Harvey, 494 US 344 (1990); Kansas v.
Ventris, 556 US 586 (2009).
136556 US 586, 593–94 (2009).
137Ibid. at 593.
138See, e.g., United States v. Fellers, 397 F 3d 1090 (8th Cir. 2005).
139Tomkovicz, 2012 at 48 (“There is nothing about the governmental conduct that is the concern
of Massiah–deliberate elicitation of admissions from an uncounseled defendant–that casts doubt
upon the reliability of statements made or the fruits of those statements.”).
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which is both more textualist in its interpretation of the Constitution and more
hostile to remedies that impede the search for truth in criminal cases.140
4.3 The Miranda Safeguards Against Coerced Confessions
Sixth Amendment protections are limited to citizen-police interactions that occur
after the ﬁling of formal charges. As a result, the Sixth Amendment does not apply
to most police interrogations, which occur earlier in the process.141 This helps
explain why, even after the Supreme Court had decided Massiah and established
Sixth Amendment protections during certain pretrial encounters between police and
suspects, it remained concerned that police interrogations were not sufﬁciently
regulated. A majority of the Justices believed that pretrial interrogations—as a
result of their isolated and non-transparent setting—harbored the risk that police
would use physical or psychological pressure to compel suspects to confess.
Tominimize this risk of compelled statements, in 1966, inMiranda v. Arizona, the
Court established new safeguards for custodial interrogations. It held that whenever
police interrogate a suspect who is in custody, theymust warn him that he has the right
to remain silent, that anything he saysmay be used in evidence against him, that he has
the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney, onewill
be appointed for him. If the suspect asserts his right to remain silent, the police must
honor that right and cease questioning, although they can resume questioning after a
“cooling off” period and after taking measures (such as providing a new set of
Miranda warnings) to ensure that the subsequent interrogation is free of coercion.142
When a suspect invokes his right to counsel, police must again stop interrogation
and are forbidden from initiating any further questioning.143As theCourt explained in
Edwards v. Arizona, “additional safeguards are necessary when the accused asks for
counsel [as opposed to invoking only the right to remain silent].”144 This is because
the request for counsel indicates that the suspect does not feel capable to face the
pressures of interrogations on his own, so the need for protection appears stronger.
While police must stop questioning once the suspect has asked for an attorney, they
donot need to provide an attorney to himat the stationhouse. Indigent suspects typically
have a lawyer appointed for them—and meet their lawyer for the ﬁrst time—at their
initial arraignment before a magistrate, which must occur within 48 hours of arrest.
140Ibid. at 48–49.
141Moran v. Burbine, 475 US 412, 428–32 (1986).
142Michigan v. Mosley, 423 US 96, 106–07 (1975).
143Edwards v. Arizona, 451 US 477, 484–85 (1981). A sufﬁciently long break in custody, how-
ever, allows the police to reapproach the subject and attempt to interrogate him anew, after giving
a fresh set of Miranda warnings. Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 US 98, 104 (2010). Likewise, the
suspect may himself reinitiate contact with the authorities, in which case they may resume the
interrogation and obtain a valid waiver of Miranda rights.
144Edwards v. Arizona, 451 US 477, 484 (1981).
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Miranda therefore assures them that suspects would not be further interrogated by the
police until they have an attorney present with them—not that counsel will be made
available to them immediately upon request (in practice, once an attorney is present, she
advises her client not to say anything in response to police questioning, so police do not
in fact conduct further interrogations of the suspect once counsel is present).
If the police fail to follow the Miranda rules, any resulting statement will be
excluded from trial.145 Moreover, the prosecution is prohibited from commenting to
the jury about the silence of the defendant during a custodial interrogation, or about
the defendant’s decision to invoke his Miranda rights.146
The suspect may waive his right to remain silent and his right to the presence of an
attorney. The government must prove that the suspect did so knowingly, voluntarily,
and intelligently.147 Statements made after a waiver are admissible into evidence.
However, the suspect can reassert his right to remain silent or his right to an attorney at
any point during the interrogation, and the police must honor that invocation.148 The
Court’s ruling on waivers has been criticized by many, including the dissenters in
Miranda. Critics note that police ofﬁcers who might coerce a confession might sim-
ilarly coerce a waiver, and the warnings do little to reduce that likelihood.149
When Miranda was decided, it was greeted with hostility by many in law
enforcement and in Congress. In fact, just two years after the decision was handed
down, Congress passed a statute that re-imposed the totality-of-circumstances vol-
untariness test for evaluating confessions in federal court; under that standard,
Miranda warnings were optional.150 Federal prosecutors ignored the statute, how-
ever, as they doubted its constitutionality. When the law was ﬁnally challenged in the
courts in 2000, the Supreme Court struck it down as incompatible with Miranda.151
Some critics of Miranda have complained that it has stifled efforts to reform the
law governing confessions in the United States:
The Miranda decision has petriﬁed the law of pre-trial interrogation for the past twenty
years, foreclosing the possibility of developing and implementing alternatives that would be
of greater effectiveness both in protecting the public from crime and in ensuring fair
treatment of persons suspected of crime.… Nothing is likely to change in the future as long
as Miranda remains in effect and perpetuates a perceived risk of invalidation for any
alternative system that departs from it.152
145As subsequent discussion elaborates, the statement may be used to impeach the defendant, if he
testiﬁes at trial.
146See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436, 468 n. 37 (1966).
147Ibid. at 444–45.
148Ibid.
149See, e.g., ibid. at 505 (Justice Harlan, dissenting) (“The new rules are not designed to guard
against police brutality or other unmistakably banned forms of coercion. Those who use
third-degree tactics and deny them in court are equally able and destined to lie as skillfully about
warnings and waivers.”).
15018 USC § 3501.
151Dickerson v. United States, 530 US 428, 443 (2000).
152Cassell, 1996 at 498 (citing Ofﬁce of Legal Policy, 1989 at 437).
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Contrary to this prediction, however, recent years have seen a steady increase in
jurisdictions that have adopted policies and laws requiring audio- or
video-recording of interrogations.153 Such recording is mandated in addition to,
rather than as an alternative to, Miranda warnings, and is therefore consistent with
federal constitutional requirements.
While legislative efforts have largely focused on supplementing Miranda rules,
the Supreme Court has itself gradually reduced the scope of Miranda protections.
The ﬁrst way in which this weakening has occurred is the deﬁnition of custody.
Miranda only applies to defendants who are in custody, because the Court has held
that it is only then that the police-dominated atmosphere and isolation leads to the
type of compulsion that the Fifth Amendment prohibits. But over time, the Court
has explained that not every interrogation at a police station is necessarily custodial.
For example, a suspect is not in custody if he comes to the station voluntarily and is
told that he is free to leave.154 Likewise, an ordinary trafﬁc stop is not considered
custodial for purposes of Miranda protections.155
Over time, the Court has also made it more difﬁcult for suspects to invoke their
Miranda rights and easier to waive those rights. While Miranda suggested that the
government bears a “heavy burden” to show that a suspect has knowingly, vol-
untarily, and intelligently waived his rights, more recent cases have suggested that
the burden is not that difﬁcult to meet. For example, the suspect need not be told of
the scope of investigation and need not be told that an attorney was trying to reach
him.156 Essentially, for a waiver to be knowing, all that the suspect must understand
is the meaning of the Miranda warnings themselves. Recent cases have further
expanded the ability of suspects to provide implied—and therefore potentially
unintentional—waivers. Thus a suspect who remained silent in the face of pro-
longed questioning was found to have waived his rights because he spoke English,
showed no signs of mental disability, and ultimately, after several hours of ques-
tioning by the police, provided answers to a few questions.157
At the same time that it has loosened the standard for valid Miranda waivers, the
Court has tightened the requirements for invoking Miranda rights. It has held that
for Miranda protections to attach, the suspect must invoke his rights in a clear and
153For example, of statutory regulation, see 725 Illinois Compiled Statutes 5, Section 103-2.1;
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.22. For example, of judicial regulation, see Stephan
v. State, 711 P 2d 1156 (Alaska 1985); State v. Scales, 518 NW 2d 587, 592 (Minnesota 1994).
The Innocence Project reports that “24 states, from North Carolina to Massachusetts to Illinois,
require the recording of custodial interrogations through law or court action. More than a thousand
additional law enforcement agencies voluntarily record interrogations.” Innocence Project, 2017;
see also Sullivan, 2014. The Department of Justice has also announced a policy that establishes a
presumption in favor of recording of custodial interrogations. Memorandum from James M. Cole,
2014 at 2.
154California v. Beheler, 463 US 1121, 1123–24 (1983); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 US 492, 495
(1977).
155Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 US 420, 439–41 (1984).
156Moran v. Burbine, 475 US 412, 422–23 (1986).
157Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 US 370, 385–86 (2010).
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unequivocal fashion. If the assertion is ambiguous or hesitant at all, police are free
to proceed with their questions.158 Under this jurisprudence, only the conﬁdent or
legally well-educated suspects can properly invoke their Miranda rights.
The Supreme Court has also gradually shrunk the scope of Miranda’s exclu-
sionary rule. The Miranda decision itself did not spend much time justifying the
need to exclude evidence to remedy Miranda violations. Because a violation of
Miranda was presumed to be a violation of the Privilege against Self-Incrimination,
the admission of Miranda-defective statements into evidence was thought to be
itself a compulsion banned by the Fifth Amendment.159
Just ﬁve years later, however, in Harris v. New York, the Court held that the pros-
ecution may introduceMiranda-defective statements at trial to impeach the credibility
of the defendant if he testiﬁes in a manner inconsistent with those statements.160 The
Court justiﬁed this exception in part by noting the importance of impeachment as a
“traditional truth-testing device[] of the adversary process.”161 It further stated that
exclusion ofMiranda-defective statements is not always required because a violation of
Miranda is not necessarily a violation of the Fifth Amendment.162 The Court suggested
that exclusion underMiranda should be examined separately from the underlying Fifth
Amendment right and should be imposed only when it is necessary to deter police
misconduct in obtaining confessions.163
In several subsequent cases, the Court reafﬁrmed the idea that Miranda is a
“mere” prophylactic device that sweeps more broadly than the Privilege against
Self-Incrimination itself. Because of this, Miranda exclusion is generally limited
only to those cases where the need to deter police misconduct is greatest and
outweighs the interest in admitting probative statements into evidence.
Accordingly, while Miranda-defective statements themselves must be suppressed
from trial, evidence derived from these statements can generally be used.164
For similar reasons, the Court has also carved out a public safety exception to the
Miranda exclusionary rule. A statement obtained without proper warnings may
nonetheless be admissible if police reasonably believed that a threat to public safety
158Davis v. United States, 512 US 452, 459 (1994); Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 US 370, 381
(2010).
159See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436, 439, 461–62, 479, 490–91 (1966).
160401 US 222, 225–26 (1971).
161Ibid. at 225.
162Ibid. at 224. The Court points out that “[p]etitioner makes no claim that the statements made to
the police were coerced or involuntary” and then later suggests that interrogations that violate
Miranda may nonetheless produce trustworthy statements.
163See ibid. at 225 (“Assuming that the exclusionary rule has a deterrent effect on proscribed police
conduct, sufﬁcient deterrence flows when the evidence in question is made unavailable to the
prosecution in its case in chief.”).
164Michigan v. Tucker, 417 US 433, 449 (1974); United States v. Patane, 542 US 630, 643–44
(2004). The one situation in which the fruits of a Miranda violation may be inadmissible is when a
suspect ﬁrst provides a statement in the absence of Miranda warnings and then makes a subse-
quent confession after warnings are properly given. The second confession may be inadmissible,
particularly if ofﬁcers act in bad faith. Missouri v. Seibert, 542 US 600, 615–17 (2004).
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required them to interrogate the suspect swiftly and without giving Miranda
warnings.165 Therefore, if police need to quickly obtain information about a hidden
weapon, an explosive device, or a dangerous associate of the suspect who is on the
loose, they may be permitted to question the suspect about those subjects without
ﬁrst giving Miranda warnings.166
At bottom, the narrowing of theMiranda exclusionary rule has beenmotivated by a
belief that Miranda protections are not expressly required by the Constitution, that
Miranda-defective statements are reliable, and that the Miranda exclusionary rule
interferes too greatly with the search for truth and the effective enforcement of
criminal law.
4.4 Exclusion of Evidence Obtained by Torture
or Undue Coercion
U.S. law criminalizes torture and mandates exclusion for evidence obtained in
violation of this prohibition. The United States is a party to the Convention Against
Torture (CAT), and the U.S. Congress passed the Torture Act, which criminalizes
torture under federal law, to comply with its obligations under CAT.167 The Act
deﬁnes torture as “an act committed by a person acting under the color of law
speciﬁcally intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other than
165New York v. Quarles, 467 US 649, 655–56 (1984).
166See Wright, 2011.
16718 USC §2340. The Act provides that “whoever outside the United States commits or attempts
to commit torture shall be ﬁned… or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both, and if death
results … shall be punished by death or imprisoned for any term of years or for life.” The federal
courts have jurisdiction if “the alleged offender is a national of the United States, or if the alleged
offender is present in the United States, irrespective of the nationality of the victim or alleged
offender.” The Act narrows the scope of mental pain or suffering and limits it to severe mental pain
or suffering caused by threats of death, torture, or drugging the victim or third party. The UN
Committee Against Torture has requested that the US “ensure that acts of psychological torture
were not limited to prolonged mental harm but constituted a wider category of acts, which caused
severe mental suffering, irrespective of duration.” Luban et al., 2014 at 1162. Torture is already
criminalized under US law (for example, torture could be prosecuted as assault and murder under
state law), so Section 2340A is meant to apply to torture outside the country. But the UN
Committee Against Torture has expressed concern that state prohibitions typically carry lower
sentences than the Torture and War Crimes Statutes. Ibid. at 1165–66.
When ratifying CAT, the US Senate added an understanding that the phrase “cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment” means only the kind of treatment forbidden by US constitutional prohibitions
on cruel and unusual punishment and on violations of due process law. The Supreme Court has
held that government conduct violates due process when it “shocks the conscience.” Because the
“shock the conscience” test is a sliding scale, lawyers in the Bush administration had argued that
certain methods of “enhanced interrogation” used to interrogate suspected terrorists after
September 11 would not shock the conscience and were therefore not prohibited by the Torture
Act. Luban, 2014 at 122.
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pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another person within his
custody or physical control.”168
While the Torture Act applies to acts committed outside the United States, other
state and federal statutes prohibit the use of excessive force by government ofﬁ-
cials.169 These have occasionally given rise to criminal prosecutions.170 Civil
remedies provide another mechanism of enforcing the ban against torture.171
American courts have also aimed to deter police brutality and limit its effects by
excluding evidence obtained by torture. As discussed in Sect. 4.1, coerced con-
fessions (i.e., confessions obtained through either coercion or torture) were
excluded initially under the common law and subsequently under the Privilege
against Self-Incrimination and the Due Process Clause. Under a voluntariness
analysis, evidence obtained by any coercion that overwhelms the will of the
accused—which is certain to include torture—is inadmissible.
As a preventive matter, safeguards such asMiranda warnings, access to a lawyer
(including appointed lawyer when the detainee cannot afford one), and access to
medical staff in jail all help prevent undue coercion and torture of detainees. Torture
and physical coercion by ofﬁcers are therefore almost unheard of in civilian settings
in the United States today.172
4.5 Debate on Exclusionary Rules
Debates on exclusionary rules have focused primarily on the exclusion of physical
evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment and statements obtained in
violation of Miranda. While commentators have argued about the contours of the
law deﬁning coerced statements under the Due Process Clause and the Privilege
against Self-Incrimination, exclusion of coerced statements has not been contro-
versial.173 This Section therefore focuses on the debates about the Miranda
exclusionary rule, which has garnered signiﬁcant attention from the law enforce-
ment community, lawyers, academic commentators, and the public at large.
16818 USC § 2340.
169See, e.g., 18 USC § 113 (criminalizing assaults within special maritime and territorial juris-
diction of the United States, such as federal land); United States v. Parker, CR-H-83-66 (S.D.
Texas 1983), aff’d sub. nom. United States v. Lee, 744 F 2d 1124 (5th Cir. 1984).
170See, e.g., United States v. Parker, CR-H-83-66 (S.D. Texas 1983).
171Individuals can bring claims for violations of civil rights against state ofﬁcials under 14 USC §
1983, and for negligence and intentional torts of federal ofﬁcials under the Federal Tort Claims
Act, 22 USC § 2671. In addition, the Torture Victims’ Protection Act provides US national with a
cause of action for torture committed under color of foreign law, and the Alien Tort Claims Act
provides a similar cause of action to foreigners. 28 USC § 1350.
172This report does not discuss allegations of torture by US agents in military settings after 9/11.
For a review of these allegations, see Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 2014.
173See, e.g., Alschuler, 1997; Godsey, 2005; Primus, 2015.
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Some commentators have praised Miranda for reducing the coerciveness of
interrogations by forcing ofﬁcers to remember and state the suspects’ rights before
each interrogation.174 Some have also argued that Miranda has been easier to
administer, as it provides brighter and more predictable rules for the legality of
confessions than the voluntariness test.175 Miranda has also been lauded for edu-
cating individuals about their rights to remain silent and to consult a lawyer. As the
Supreme Court has noted, Miranda has “become part of our national culture” and is
thus well-known by a broad segment of the population.176
Yet Miranda has also been subject to scrutiny and criticism from the very
beginning. When it was ﬁrst decided, most law enforcement ofﬁcers were skeptical
and resistant.177 (Not long afterward, however, empirical studies found that depart-
ments complied with “the letter, though not always the spirit” of Miranda rules.)178
Some law enforcement ofﬁcers and scholars have expressed concerns that
Miranda has reduced the number of confessions that police have obtained and has
thus reduced the crime clearance rate and hurt victims of crime, innocent suspects,
and the public at large.179 Indeed, several studies have found that Miranda has
reduced the number of confessions obtained by police.180 A couple have reported a
15–18% drop in the success rate of obtaining incriminating statements after
Miranda; others have found a less signiﬁcant reduction.181 Yet even if Miranda has
limited law enforcement’s ability to obtain confessions, this has not led to an
appreciable loss of convictions, because prosecutors have been able to obtain
convictions based on other sources of evidence.182
174Some have argued that it has made law enforcement ofﬁcers “more professional” in their
interrogations. Brief of Grifﬁn B. Bell, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Dickerson v.
United States, 530 US 428 (2000) (No. 99-5525), cited in Weisselberg, 2008 at 1595; see also
Leo, 2001 at 1010 (“[S]ome researchers have argued that Miranda eradicated the last vestiges of
third degree interrogation present in the mid-1960s, increased the level of professionalism among
interrogators, and raised public awareness of constitutional rights”). Others, however, have argued
that “Miranda is … virtually worthless as a safeguard against speciﬁc interrogation practices that
were characterized as abusive in the Miranda decision….” (OLP Report, cited in Cassell, 1996 at
477).
175Brief of Grifﬁn B. Bell, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Dickerson v. United
States, 530 US 428 (2000) (No. 99-5525), cited in Weisselberg, 2008 at 1595.
176Dickerson v. United States, 530 US 428, 443 (200).
177Leo, 2001 at 1002–03.
178Ibid. at 1003.
179E.g., Cassell, 1996 at 115.
180Cassell/Hayman, 1996 at 871 (ﬁnding a drop from 55–60% pre-Miranda to 42.2% post-
Miranda in the success rate of obtaining confessions); Seeburger/Wettick, 1967 at 12 tbl.
2 (ﬁnding that confessions dropped from 48.5% pre-Miranda to 32.3% after Miranda); Witt, 1973
at 320.
181For a summary of the studies, some of which conflict in their ﬁndings, see Leo, above note 174,
at 1004–06.
182Leo, 2001 at 1004–06.
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Critics of Miranda have argued, however, that the total societal cost of Miranda
is higher, as it includes cases that never result in charges being ﬁled (and are
therefore not even calculated as “convictions lost”), sentence discounts given
during plea bargains to account for possible Miranda violations and for failure to
obtain incriminating statements,183 and the costs to the judicial system of litigating
Miranda issues. Others have disputed these conclusions, as well as the methodol-
ogy underlying the studies that produced them.184 After reviewing the empirical
research on Miranda, one scholar argued that “for all practical purposes, Miranda’s
empirically detectable net damage to law enforcement is zero.”185
In short, the question whether Miranda has resulted in an appreciable number of
lost confessions or lost convictions continues to be debated. There is, however,
broad consensus among scholars that 80–90% of suspects today waive their
Miranda rights and make statements to the police, most of which are incriminating
or otherwise helpful to the prosecution.186 In addition, even when Miranda vio-
lations are raised with courts, these claims are only rarely successful (less than 10%
of the time), at least in part because of the numerous exceptions to the Miranda
exclusionary rule that the Court has carved out.187 This helps explain why police
ofﬁcers have learned that they can “live” with Miranda.188
The high rate of Miranda waivers and the rarity of suppression of Miranda-
defective statements provide the basis for a different critique of Miranda safeguards
—that they are too ineffectual in preventing coerced and false confessions. Critics
point to the 80% waiver ﬁgure to argue that in too many cases, suspects waive their
rights, and ofﬁcers are free to proceed with coercive psychological tactics to procure
a confession. Other critics have also pointed out that Miranda has distracted courts
from examining the voluntariness of confessions. Once judges see that warnings
have been given, they rarely inquire further into the voluntariness of the ensuing
confession.189 On this view, the warnings regime by Miranda has done little to
reduce the psychological pressure that ofﬁcers place on suspects to confess.190
183Cassell, 1996 at 439–46.
184See, e.g., Leo/Ofshe, 1998 at 557 n. 2; Schulhofer, (1996) 91 at 280; Weisselberg, 1998 at 173–
74.
185Schulhofer, (1996) 90 at 547.
186Cassell, 1996; Leo, 2001 at 1009.
187Nardulli, 1983 at 593, 595 tbl. 2, 596, 597 tbl. 7 (ﬁnding that motions to suppress confessions
were ﬁled in 6.6% of all cases and that only 2.5% of these motions were successful); Valdes, 2005
at 1729 (ﬁnding that motions to suppress confessions on the basis ofMiranda were made in 3.97%
of cases and succeeded 9.86% of the time).
188See, e.g., Leo, 2001 at 1012.
189Ibid. at 1025–26.
190Interviews with two Texas defense attorneys and two prosecutors suggest that although physical
coercion is a thing of the past, psychological tactics—especially lying to suspects about the
evidence in the case—continue to be commonly used. As the defense attorneys interviewed
suggested, such tactics, particularly when used with vulnerable (e.g., young or cognitively
impaired) suspects, can result in false confessions. See above note 116.
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The problem is said to be particularly acute with respect to certain more vulnerable
suspects, such as juveniles, non-native speakers, and mentally disabled suspects,
who are most likely to confess falsely as a result of psychological pressure and are
least likely to comprehend the Miranda warnings.191
Finally, some critics argue that, over time, Supreme Court jurisprudence has
weakened the Miranda safeguards to such a point that whatever effectiveness the
rule might have had when originally adopted has now been undermined.192 Some
have accordingly called for a rethinking and strengthening of the voluntariness
analysis as an alternative to Miranda, because it is regarded as the only doctrine left
to regulate pretrial interrogations in a meaningful way.193 Others have called for
videotaping—imposed via legislative or judicial means—as the most effective
supplement to Miranda in ensuring the voluntariness of confessions.194 Finally,
another preventive measure that scholars have increasingly proposed to minimize
false confessions is the training of police ofﬁcers in less manipulative interrogation
techniques, particularly when interrogating vulnerable suspects.195
5 Conclusion
Although U.S. law does not expressly impose a duty to search for truth in criminal
cases, courts recognize the importance of accurate factﬁnding to just outcomes and
the effective enforcement of criminal law. Yet truthseeking at times must give way
to protections of individual rights. The conflict between the search for truth and the
protection of rights arises when courts decide whether to exclude unlawfully
obtained evidence. When the Constitution does not expressly require exclusion as a
remedy, U.S. courts have openly considered the costs of exclusion to the search for
truth and have tried to limit those costs. Courts have therefore admitted Miranda-
defective confessions for purposes of impeachment, Miranda-defective statements
obtained to protect public safety, as well as most fruits of Miranda-defective
statements. At the same time, courts always exclude coerced confessions, in part
because the Constitution requires such exclusion, in part because of concerns about
the confessions’ reliability, and in part because of the greater need to deter the
police misconduct at issue.
On their own, U.S. exclusionary rules for tainted confessions have not succeeded
in eliminating involuntary confessions. Recent DNA exonerations have revealed
that false confessions continue to occur and are a leading contributing factor to
191Weisselberg, 2008 at 1565–68 (discussing studies); see also Garrett, 2012 at 38.
192E.g., Weisselberg, 2008.
193Primus, 2015.
194Interviewees also suggested that videotaping has been very important in reducing coerced
confessions in Texas. See above note 116.
195See, e.g., Kassin et al., 2010 at 3–38.
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wrongful convictions. Accordingly, policymakers and commentators have looked
for additional safeguards to prevent the occurrence of such confessions. The main
reform being proposed and implemented in this regard is the audio- or
video-recording of interrogations.196 An increasing number of cities and states are
adopting policies and laws requiring such recording. As evidence about the oper-
ation of recording becomes available, law enforcement is becoming more receptive
to the practice.
Additionally, scholars and police departments are increasingly recognizing the
importance of training ofﬁcers in special techniques for interrogating vulnerable
suspects197 Such techniques, focused on open-ended questioning rather than psy-
chological manipulation, are expected to minimize the risk of false confessions.198
Whatever additional reforms of interrogation practice are adopted, Miranda
safeguards and the exclusion of coerced confessions provide an important backstop
for regulating police conduct. While imposing some burdens on the search for truth,
these procedures encourage police compliance with the Constitution and educate
suspects (as well as the population) about their rights.
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